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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
E N I D C O S G R I F F M U R P H Y , 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
Case No. 
vs>
 [ 13748 
M I C H A E L E D W A R D M U R P H Y , 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E K I N D O F CASE 
This is a divorce action. 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N T H E L O W E R COURT 
The case was tried to the Court. The District 
Court awarded Enid Cosgriff Murphy the divorce and 
her property that she had brought into the marriage. 
The Court awarded Michael Edward Murphy the 
sums obtained from the sale of a farm in Minnesota 
1 
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and directed that Enid Cosgriff Murphy return to 
Michael Edward Murphy, without payment, Michael 
Edward Murphy's note payable to Enid Cosgriff 
Murphy in the amount of $22,500.00 but failed to re-
quire Enid Cosgriff Murphy to contribute to or share 
in the disastrous financial losses incurred during the 
course of the marriage. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Michael Edward Murphy seeks on this appeal, 
a) A modification of the trial court's Decree of 
Divorce to require Enid Cosgriff Murphy to contribute 
equally to the financial losses sustained during the 
course of the marriage (based on the evidence received 
by the Court), and 
b) To remand the case to the District Court with 
the requirement that the trial court receive evidence as 
to what would be the appreciated value of assets 
brought into the marriage by Michael Edward Murphy 
in order to determine his actual financial loss during 
the course of the marriage, and to require Enid Cos-
griff Murphy to contribute equally to this increment 
of loss, and 
c) To order that the pleadings, i.e. the prayer of 
the Complaint, be amended to conform to the evidence 
setting forth a demand for an equitable contribution 
on the part of Enid Cosgriff Murphy to the financial 
losses of the parties. 
2 
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d) To reverse the trial court and award the De-
cree of Divorce to Michael Edward Murphy, or in the 
alternative, to award him a Decree of Divorce as well 
as to Enid Cosgriff Murphy. 
IDENTIFICATION OF T H E PARTIES A N D 
E X P L A N A T I O N OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Michael Edward Murphy, the Defendant and Ap-
pellant, will hereinafter be referred to as the Defend-
ant or where appropriate, by his name. Enid Cosgriff 
Murphy, the Plaintiff and Respondent, will hereinafter 
be referred to as the Plaintiff, or where appropriate, 
by her name. 
"R" refers to a page reference in the record of the 
case and " T " refers to a page reference in the trans-
cript of the trial case. 
S T A T E M E N T OF F A C T S 
Enid Cosgriff Murphy brought an action for di-
vorce against Michael Edward Murphy alleging mental 
cruelty (R-1). She initially sought a decree granting 
her the divorce (R-2). Subsequently, she also sought 
a property settlement granting to each party his re-
spective funds (R-56-60). Michael Edward Murphy 
counterclaimed and sought a divorce in his own right 
(R-4). At the trial, he urged the Court to require Enid 
Cosgriff Murphy to contribute to the financial losses 
3 
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he incurred during their marriage (T-103). The dis-
position in the lower court and the relief sought on 
appeal are set forth on pages 1 and 2 of this Brief. 
The essential facts are not in dispute. The De-
fendant Michael Edward Murphy, prior to his marriage 
to Enid Cosgriff Murphy in 1964, was a bachelor prac-
ticing internal medicine in Salt Lake City (T-82, T-
150). Enid Cosgriff Murphy was the widow of the 
late Walter Cosgriff of Salt Lake City (T-3). At 
the time of his marriage to Enid Cosgriff Murphy, 
Michael Edward Murphy was residing in his home on 
Fortuna Way which he had purchased in May, 1963 
(T-81). He also owned a cottage in Brighton Canyon 
which he had built in 1951. In May of 1963 Michael 
Edward Murphy inherited a farm in Minnesota con-
sisting of 312 acres (T-81). On January 21, 1964, 
Michael Edward Murphy and Enid Cosgriff were 
married and commenced living in Michael Edward 
Murphy's home on Fortuna Way (T-26). Shortly 
after the marriage and in concession to the wishes of 
Mrs. Murphy, improvements were made to the Bright-
on Canyon cottage (T-100). In 1964 and 1965, 
prompted by the insistence of Mrs. Murphy, the ad-
joining lot on Fortuna Way was purchased (T-105). 
Then, in November of 1966, again upon the initiative 
of Mrs. Cosgriff, Michael Edward Murphy purchased 
acreage adjoining his farm in Minnesota, the adjoining 
acreage being known as the Sullivan farm (T-108). 
During April or May of 1968, Mrs. Murphy left Dr. 
Murphy. In June of that year, the Brighton cottage 
4 
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was sold in < • d- i \ Inve enough cash to meet the 
annual obligations on the For tuna W a y home and the 
S-sllivan farm (T-113, T-176, T-177). I n August of 
H. Enid Cosgriff Murphy commenced a divorce pro-
ceeding. I n October of 1968, while the parties were 
separated Michael Edward Murphy sold the For tuna 
W a y home and adjoining h>\ ( T - n : r Th* purpose 
O'f O i r :>aV u ; , - , ! o i l l , ' i ' h e i1*t"»K pnyi lKMlt 'S d u e Oil 
the Sullivan farm and to pay for farm supplies needed 
for the past growing season all t ogdher totalling 
$15,000.00 to $20,000.00 (T-115, T-176, T-177 L There-
after Michael Edward Murphy mo\<d i» ill.- Cau\on 
Crest Apartments in Salt Lake fit* . hi December of 
1968, the parties reconciled. In June a? Tw :°. Enid 
Cosgriff Murphy purchased for Michael Edward 
Murphy adjoining acreage in Minnesota known as the 
"Woodlot" which therefore had been known as the 
Naeseth farm, consisting of about 40 acres. Dur ing 
August of 1969, the parties moved i ,o Minnesota and 
thereafter, encouraged and prodded by Enid Cosgriff 
Murpln . v;p•.:• i'* ' Minu an 1 remodeling projects 
were undertaken (T-IK». T-129). I n September of 
1970, Michael Edward Murphy pu'vlm»ed the Cash-
man farm consisting of 136 acres, (T-170, Exh . loD1}. 
Again, Enid Cosgriff Murphy was interested in this 
acquisition ;unl was influential in its purchase (T-169, 
T-170 K l)n-'M.u June and .Inly *»*' !:*'.'' K?;Sd Cos-
griff Mmpt: \w »;' 1 Europe with her sister and 
brother-in-law for two months (T-122). After her re-
tu rn in November of 1971, the parties built a manager's 
home on t lwi '^••<rinal farm, again upon the insistence of 
5 
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Mrs. Murphy (T-123). In May of 1972, the parties 
separated ( T - l l ) . 
At the time of their marriage, Michael Edward 
Murphy had a net worth of $192,000.00 consisting of 
cash, his home on Fortuna Way, a cottage in Brighton 
Canyon, farm acreage and equipment in Minnesota, 
automobiles, a medical practice and other items (R-50). 
Mrs. Murphy at that time had a net worth of $1,726,-
167.56 (Ex. 2D). About one year after the separation 
of the parties, Michael Edward Murphy was forced to 
sell what had begun as his farm and over which Mrs. 
Cosgriff now held equal control (T-178). He had 
assets of $80,516.00 consisting of cash and an auto-
mobile and liabilities of $22,500.00 consisting of a note 
payable to Enid Cosgriff Murphy which resulted in a 
net worth of only $58,010.00. On the other hand, Mrs. 
Murphy had an increased net worth of $1,946,961.93 
(Ex. 4-D). 
P O I N T I 
T H E T R I A L COURT E R R E D I N NOT RE-
Q U I R I N G E N I D C O S G R I F F M U R P H Y TO 
C O N T R I B U T E TO T H E F I N A N C I A L LOSS 
S U S T A I N E D D U R I N G T H E M A R R I A G E . 
A loss of over $133,000.00 was sustained by Dr. 
Murphy during his marriage to Enid Cosgriff (R-50). 
The record is clear as to Enid Cosgriff Murphy's in-
volvement in the transactions that lead to that loss 
6 
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(T-l 76, 17 7" T-> W:\ p-quitr Mrs. Murphy to equally 
share in t\ui loss*.:* >u>iam^I v*as an nlujM "f discretion 
on the part of *lv f: ml ^nun. 
The ]»artie;, were married ^n January 23, 1964 
(T-2V V ^<J timr of the marriage, I )r Murphy's 
net worth amounted to approximately $192,0^0 **0 < in-
sisting of tlv following (R-50) (T-81, 82) : 
Item Value 
Cash $ 15,000,00 
Equi ty in home on 
For tuna W a y , Salt I ,akn 
City, I Jtali $ 18,500.00 
Brighton Canyon cottage $ 20,000.00 
F a r m and equipment in 
Minnesota inherited by 
T); A T u rphy free a n -1 
i'l<inr «»i encumbrance:, . - i ,4>| i;u>(HM)0 
r^<» automobiles ^ is ,000 00 
Medical practice in Salt 
• Lake City, I Jtah $ iMJMMMJO 
Country Club membership 
and various securities :; •;. MIO.OO 
A t the same time, Enid Cosgriff's estate amounted 
to $1,748,667.56, consisting of the following (R~48) 
(Exhibit 2 - D ) : 
7 
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Item Value 
Cash $ 3,828.56 
Notes receivable with 
respect to a golf course $ 42,500.00 
Continental Bank & Trust 
Company stock $1,671,695.00 
Various other stocks $ 20,644.00 
Car, furniture and 
other personal effects 
(Exhibit 2-D) (R-48) $ 10,000.00 
Upon their marriage, the parties lived in Dr. 
Murphy's home on Fortuna Way (T-26). Within the 
first year of the marriage, the adjoining lot on Fortuna 
Way was purchased (T-27, 83) (Exhibits 10-D, 11-
D ) . The acquisition was made at the suggestion and 
insistence of Enid Cosgriff Murphy (T-27). Her mo-
tivation was to build a guest house (T-29). Dr. Murphy 
was opposed to the purchase and to the proposed build-
ing (T-104). Nevertheless the lot was acquired upon 
Mrs. Murphy's insistence and contribution of a small 
down payment considering her true financial capacity 
with the apparent intention to make yearly payments 
(T-105). But after getting him into the deal, she 
later refused to meet the yearly obligations thereon 
(T-113). The guest house was built as Mrs. Murphy 
desired and was connected to the main house by a 
bridge and for a time was used as a five-car garage 
(T-106) (Ex. 10-D, 11-D). 
8 
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Next ruinr \])t> expansion of the farm operation in 
" " inesota. In November of 1966, while the parties 
were still living in Salt Lake City, the Sullivan farm 
in Minnesota, consisting of approximately 228 acres 
ad joining the original farm of Dr . Murphy, was pur-
chased (T-47) . Mrs. Cosgriff was the driving force 
behind this acquisition (T-108). She paid $15,000.00 
as a down payment \\ ilh th<» apparent intention <*f mak-
ing the yearly payments of $6,000.00 and • *i M! -\\IX *h<-
farm to D r . Murphy (T-109) . 
Aftrr separation and initiation of divorce proceed-
ings in UM5H, Mrs Cosgriff told D r . Murphy that she 
had ii" iiitmli''*; "f making the $6,000.00 annual pay-
ment on the Sulln :m fnrm. I n fact, she suggested that 
Dr . Murphy return the farm to Mr. Sullivan whom 
she stated would be glad to get it back free (T-113) . 
I n an effort to keep the Minnesota operation D r . 
Murphy then made the payments. In dom^ *o h< hud 
to liquidate his Salt Lake assets for lb' n; >'drd ,^sh 
(T-iTr.V lh- first sold the Brighton cottage I"' S^-
000.00 ( T-113, 159). Then inasmuch as the annual pay-
ments on the Sullivan farm amounted to $6,000.00, 
with annual purchases of supplies for the farm running 
$15,000.00 to $20,000.00 (T-115) plus being respons-
ible for the payments on the For tuna W a y complex. 
D r . Murphy I1 id no alternative but *•> liquids*!* Hie 
For tuna W a y properties. I t MJIS dii'fn ult in f;ml a 
buyer since the For tuna W a y residence with the sub-
stantial additions had become an unusual two-unit com-
plex (T-114). To piit tb^ property in a saleable form, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Dr. Murphy converted the complex into two separate 
units to be sold separately. In doing so, Dr. Murphy 
found it necessary to use all of the money he received 
from the sale of the Brighton cottage to cover the re-
modeling costs (T-114). Money received from the sale 
was used to pay the 1969 obligation due on the Sullivan 
farm and the required yearly supplies (T-176). 
Had it not been for Mrs. Murphy's determination 
to purchase the adjoining farm, her default in payment 
of the obligations in connection therewith, and the ob-
ligation on the Fortuna Way guest house and lot, Dr. 
Murphy would not have had the additional expenses 
he incurred nor would he have had to sell the Fortuna 
Way property and the Brighton cottage (T-176, 177). 
Acting on her own, Mrs. Murphy in 1969 bought 
an additional tract of land adjoining the original farm 
known as the "Wood lot" or Naeseth farm (T-115) 
(Exhibit 15-D). This land was intended as a gift by 
Enid Cosgriff Murphy to Dr. Murphy (T-170). She 
also had a significant influence in the purchase of the 
Cashman property adjoining the Minnesota farm land 
(T-170) (Exhibit 15-D) in September, 1969. 
Following the various land acquisitions in Minne-
sota, Mrs. Cosgriff initiated various building projects 
—the adding of garages (T-129), the addition of a 
TV library in the original home (T-129), and the put-
ting of a manager's home on the original farm (T-122). 
The manager's house alone cost $27,500.00 (T-124). 
In addition, Mrs. Cosgriff initiated a substantial re-
10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
modeling project on the original inherited farm costing 
some $6,500.00 (T-116). She had a particular purpose 
in expanding and developing the Minnesota farm. Put-
ting it simply, she apparently wanted nothing less than 
a well known farm estate. With the acquisition of the 
Sullivan farm, the 40-acre Wood Lot farm (T-115), 
the Cashman purchase (T-169, 170), and the manager's 
home, she was ready to receive guests at her home-farm 
estate (Exhibit 19-D) (T-128). She persuaded Dr. 
Murphy to name the entire estate the "Yankee Spy 
Farms" complete with stationery (Exhibit 18-D), open-
ing social festival (Exhibit 19-D), and name plates on 
farm trucks (Exhibit 16-D). I t was Enid Cosgriff 
Murphy who initiated the transformation of the farms 
and remodeling (T-115). In addition she negotiated 
for all of the remodeling work performed for the 
Yankee Spy Farms (T-116) (Exhibit 12-D). After 
the completion of this project, she entertained often 
and lavishly (T-128). 
At Dr. Murphy's request, Enid Cosgriff Murphy 
maintained the books on the Yankee Spy Farms which 
she had created, but after eleven or twelve months (T-
120) (Exhibit 14-D) lost interest and refused to do 
this work. This was the way it usually went — even 
with the farm itself. She enthusiastically engaged on 
a project involving thousands of dollars—then, after 
a while, she lost interest and left a "white elephant" on 
Dr. Murphy's hands. It was now his problem to main-
tain ov dispose of the farm. Neither alternative had 
any promise. What she considered a gift or benefit to 
11 
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Dr. Murphy was in reality an accommodation to her 
own taste and nothing but a financial burden to him 
(T-176, 177). As a matter of fact, most of the above-
mentioned acquisitions and remodeling projects were 
done without consulting at all with Dr. Murphy (T-
129) and without his consent (T-96). Irrespective of 
whose money was involved, this practice of her obtain-
ing land, building and remodeling without Dr. 
Murphy's consent or approval evidences Mrs. Murphy's 
determination to have things her own way regardless 
of Dr. Murphy's opinion. As a consequence of such 
domination and independence, Dr. Murphy not only 
suffered financially but suffered emotionally as well. 
When Enid Cosgriff Murphy left Dr. Murphy in 
1972, just prior to her filing for divorce, she left him 
in Minnesota with a huge farm estate which Dr. 
Murphy was obligated to maintain and pay for or sell 
(T-176). He had sold his Salt Lake assets to help pay 
for this financial burden. In addition, through an ab-
sence of four years, he had lost the benefit of his repu-
tation and medical practice he had in Salt Lake City. 
When Enid Cosgriff Murphy left Dr. Murphy, he en-
deavored to sell the farm complex (T-168). He realized 
only $77,000.00 net, from the sale (T-171). This 
amount was far less than the value ($113,600.00) of 
the farm and equipment he inherited free and clear of 
debt (T-178) before his marriage to Enid Cosgriff (R-
50). Viewing the farm assets alone, Dr. Murphy suf-
fered a loss of $36,600.00. And this loss was attributable 
largely to Enid Cosgriff Murphy. 
12 
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In March of 1973, Dr. Murphy's net worth was 
only $58,010.00 (R-50). When he married Enid Cos-
griff, his net worth was $192,000.00 (R-50). Finan-
cially because of Enid Cosgriff's active participation 
in Dr. Murphy's affairs, the marriage resulted in a loss 
of $133,990.00. 
In MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 
P . 2d 1066 (1951), this Court referred to Pinion v. 
Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 67 P. 2d 265, and laid down the 
guidelines for making a proper disposition of property. 
The first six factors relate to conditions at the time 
of the marriage: 
1. The social position and standard of living of 
each before marriage: Enid Cosgriff was used to a 
very high financial and social standard involving lavish 
entertaining. Dr. Murphy had a few friends, lived 
rather modestly and was quite unaccustomed to the 
standard of Mrs. Cosgriff. 
2. The respective ages of the parties: He was 46; 
she was as old or older. 
3. What each may have given up for the marriage: 
Mrs. Cosgriff gave up nothing with respect to wealth. 
She even refused to give up her Cosgriff name. Dr. 
Murphy furnished a home for the parties on Fortuna 
Way, a canyon cottage in Brighton, and the initial 
Minnesota farm consisting of 312 acres. In addition, 
his entire earnings throughout the marriage were spent 
in meeting the ordinary plus the elevated expenditures 
Mrs. Cosgriff's style of living demanded. 
13 
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4. What money or property each brought into the 
marriage: Enid Cosgriff brought approximately 1.7 
million dollars which she jealously guarded and kept 
to herself. Dr. Murphy brought assets into the marriage 
valued at $192,000.00 to which both had the use of and 
access to during and throughout the marriage. 
5. The physical and mental health of the parties: 
Both parties were in good health. 
6. The relative ability, training and education of 
the parties: H e was a medical doctor with a specialty 
in internal medicine; she had some experience in the 
business field and was conspicuously surrounded by ad-
visors. 
The following factors are to be considered at the 
time of the divorce: 
7. The time and duration of the marriage: 9 years 
in this case. 
8. The present income of the parties and property 
acquired during the marriage and owned either jointly 
or by each: See page 7 hereof and R-52, R-14. 
9. How the income and property was acquired and 
the efforts of each in doing so: 
Enid Cosgriff Murphy acquired her income 
through the assets she inherited from Walter Cosgriff. 
At the time of the trial, Dr. Murphy's sole income came 
from a relatively new medical practice in Nevada (T-
58). I t is to be noted that he had not been accepted 
there with full hospital privileges (T-60). Mrs. Murphy 
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sustained no financial loss whatsoever during the mar-
riage. Hers was a gain of approximately $200,000.00. 
Dr. Murphy's loss was at least $133,990.00. 
10. There were no children. 
11. The present health of both is good. 
12. The present ages are: He is 55; she is as old 
or older. 
13. The happiness and pleasure or lack of it ex-
perienced during the marriage: There appears to have 
been few pleasurable moments, the marriage was 
marked with constant difficulty. 
14. Any extraordinary sacrifice: There is no evid-
ence of any sacrifice at all by Mrs. Cosgriff. Dr. 
Murphy, however, sacrificed greatly in selling his For-
tuna Way home, in selling the Brighton cottage, in 
assuming the payments, maintenance and operation of 
the Minnesota farm complex created by Mrs. Cosgriff, 
and by solely absorbing the loss involved in the sale 
of the Minnesota farm. 
15. The present standard of living and needs of 
each including costs of living: Mrs. Cosgriff's estate 
at the time of the divorce was approximately 1.9 mil-
lion (Ex-4-D). Dr. Murphy's was approximately 
$58,010.00. He had lost some $133,990.00 during the 
course of the marriage. She had gained about $200,-
000.00. 
The trial court gave no consideration to the re-
quired guidelines set forth in MacDonald and Pinion. 
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I t was an abuse of discretion to impose on Dr. Murphy 
the total burden of the losses sustained during the mar-
riage. The decision of the trial court is clearly arbitrary 
and if allowed to stand would result in manifest in-
justice. This case is within the parameters of prior 
cases where this Court has held that the trial court's 
decree was unfair and inequitable under the circum-
stances. 
In Martinette v. Martinette, 8 Ut. 2d 202, 331 P . 
2d 821, this Court held that the trial court had abused 
its discretion in not awarding the husband more in a 
property settlement and modified the trial court's de-
cree. In facts peculiarly similar to the present case, 
this Court noted the growing trend of economic inde-
pendence of women and the impact it was having on 
marriages. With that in mind, the court stated: 
"It should be kept in mind that the authority 
from which orders as to alimony, support money, 
and disposition of property is derived is Sec. 30-
3-5, U.C.A. 1953, which provides that when a 
divorce decree is entered. 'The court may make 
such orders in relation to the . . . property . . . 
and the maintenance of the parties . . . as may 
be equitable. . . .' I t is important to note that 
this statute makes no distinction between the 
spouses. I t does not contemplate, nor should 
there be, any discrimination or inequality in such 
awards on the basis of sex. They may be made 
in favor of either spouse, and should be based 
upon the needs of the parties and the equities of 
the situation being dealt with. 
"[5] This point of view just expressed is sig-
nificant here because the plaintiff seems to be 
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the more aggressive of the two; and certainly is 
in a better position to fend for herself. Her 
steady work and the resulting financial inde-
pendence indicates that she is partaking of the 
general emancipation of women which has been 
taking place in various ways in recent years, in-
cluding their entrance into nearly all fields of 
endeavor. The resulting self-reliance and release 
from economic dependence upon husbands had 
produced its toll in divorces from basically mal-
adjusted and unhappy marriages. Whether this 
is good or evil, we are not called upon to say. 
I t is simply something which we who administer 
the law must recognize and deal with under the 
law as it exists, but always aware that it must 
be constantly adjusting itself to changing condi-
tions and the needs of society. In cases such as 
the instant one the ancient idea of the husband 
as the pater-familias, or the lord and master, is 
outmoded and unrealistic. I t is necessary to so 
apply the law as to do justice between them on 
the basis of a realistic appraisal of their circum-
stances and the problems each must comfort. 
" I t seems to us, that he (the husband) is not 
entirely without justification in regarding the 
property award as so disproportionate to his 
desserts that it is poor reward for his long years 
of effort in contributing to its accumulation." 
Id. at 824. 
The prerogatives of the trial court to distribute the 
property of the parties are acknowledged, but this 
Court has not hesitated to modify any decree that is 
inequitable and indicates an abuse of discretion. 
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In Be Rose v. Be Rose, 19 Ut. 2d 77, 426 P. 2d 
221 (1967), this Court said: 
"But this discretion is not without limit, not im-
mune from correction or review if that is war-
ranted. Due to the seriousness of such proceed-
ings and the vital effect they have on people's 
lives, it is also the responsibility of this Court to 
carefully survey what is done, and while the de-
terminations of the trial court are given defer-
ence and not disturbed lightly, changes should be 
made if that seems essential to the accomplish-
ment of the desired objectives of the decree; 
that is, to make such an arrangement of the 
property and economic resources of the parties 
that they will have the best possible opportunity 
to reconstruct their lives on a happy and useful 
basis for themselves and their children. An im-
portant consideration in this regard is the elim-
ination or minimization of potential frictions or 
difficulties in the future." Id. at page 222. 
Dr. Murphy is aware that he should bear his share 
of the loss involved and has never requested otherwise. 
All he is asking is to be treated equitably. Enid Cos-
griff Murphy should be required to share in the dis-
astrous losses sustained during the marriage. The rule 
established by this Court in Anderson v. Anderson 18 
Ut. 2d 286, 422 P . 2d 192 (1967), seems appropriate. 
In that case, this Court affirmed the trial court's de-
cree as to a property settlement, and repected the 
wife's contention that certain business debts of the 
parties should be paid by the Defendant's husband out 
of his earnings and that she should be awarded one-
half of all of the property which would remain after 
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the payment of such obligations. In rejecting that con-
tention, the court stated: 
"I t is a novel doctrine that would leave the hus-
band with the accumulated liabilities of 30 years 
of married life and award to the wife one-half 
of the net assets free and clear of these debts. 
Any business venture is accompanied by some 
risk of failure and to say that because the hus-
band managed these investments, it is his loss, 
but that she nevertheless will share in the profit-
able portion of his financial endeavors, is an un-
tenable suggestion. She married him for better 
or worse. This does not mean the better for her 
and the worst for him." 
The record clearly indicates that Dr. Murphy suf-
fered a substantial loss because of his marriage to Enid 
Cosgriff. His primary assets of his Fortuna Way 
home, Brighton cottage and Minnesota farm, lived in, 
skied from and vacationed at, which were subject to 
modifications had been lost to him because of the ma-
nipulation of Mrs. Murphy. Her primary assets of 
notes and stocks hidden away in vaults remained intact 
and were not used during the marriage. 
From the analysis of assets of each party and their 
use during the marriage, it is clear that the trial court 
abused its discretion in not awarding Dr. Murphy a 
more equitable property settlement. This Court should 
reverse the trial court and require Enid Cosgriff to 
share equally in the losses ($133,990.00) suffered dur-
ing the marriage, that is, she should be required to con-
tribute (pay to Dr. Murphy) the sum of $66,995.00 
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plus an additional amount as contended for under 
Point I I of this Brief. Dr. Murphy's promissory note 
in favor of Enid Cosgriff Murphy in the amount of 
$22,500.00 should remain cancelled as ordered by the 
trial court with Enid Cosgriff Murphy to have a credit 
for that amount leaving a net to be paid of $44,495.00 
plus the additional amount as set forth under Point I I 
hereof. 
P O I N T I I 
T H E COURT C O M M I T T E D E R R O R I N 
R E J E C T I N G E V I D E N C E AS TO T H E PRO-
J E C T E D V A L U E O F A S S E T S B R O U G H T IN-
TO T H E M A R R I A G E BY DR. M U R P H Y AS 
A BASIS FOR D E T E R M I N I N G H I S R E A L 
LOSS. 
Dr. Murphy's net worth at the beginning of the 
marriage was approximately $192,000.00 (R-50). His 
net worth when the parties separated was approxi-
mately $58,010.00 (R-50). The difference between 
these two figures represents a loss of $133,990.00 (R-
50). But Dr. Murphy's loss was actually much greater 
than $133,990.00. To determine his real loss, it is neces-
sary to consider what he reasonably might be expected 
to have had, had it not been for the marriage. His 
loss must take into account the appreciation he would 
otherwise have realized on assets he had when the mar-
riage began. 
The principal involved is simply this: If one were 
deprived of a piece of property which five years ago 
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was worth $10,000.00 but today is worth $20,000,000, 
then his loss viewed as today is $20,000.00. By the 
same token, if one were deprived of $10,000.00 five 
years ago, to be made whole today would not only re-
quire the recovery of the $10,000.00 but also interest 
on the $10,000.00. In either hypothetical, the actual 
loss involves the intial value plus appreciation or in-
terest, as the case may be. So it is with Dr. Murphy. 
His loss must take into account the appreciation he 
would have realized on assets he had when he entered 
into the marriage with Enid Cosgriff Murphy. 
On page 7 of this Brief, the initial assets of Dr. 
Murphy are itemized. The transactions that followed 
in the wake of the marriage and Enid Cosgriff 
Murphy's involvement in those transactions are deline-
ated under Point I of this Brief. In short, Dr. Murphy 
embarked on the marriage with an established medical 
practice (T-82), a home on Fortuna Way (T-83), a 
cottage in Brighton (T-99) and the farm in Minnesota 
(T-107, 178). With Enid Cosgriffs "help", partici-
pation and involvement, he wound up with a "white 
elephant" farm in Minnesota (T-176). 
Dr. Murphy not only lost the value of the prop-
erties he had at the time of the marriage, but he also 
lost their appreciated value as of the time the marriage 
ended. 
The interrogation of Dr. Murphy at the trial of 
the case, objections made, the action of the Court with 
respect to evidence bearing on the present value of 
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assets brought into the marriage by D r . Murphy and 
offers of proof appear on Pages 132-149 of the trans-
cript, pertinent extracts being set forth in the Appendix 
to this Brief. 
H Evidence rejected by the Court would have estab-
lished that the For tuna W a y property that was sold 
for $53,000.00 in 1968 (T-158) would have been worth 
$60,000.00 to Dr . Murphy at the time of the divorce 
(T-149) . Likewise, the Brighton cabin had a value a t 
the time of the divorce of approximately $28,000.00 as 
contrasted with the $8,000.00 for which it was sold for 
in 1968 (T-159) . 
Wi th respect to the Minnesota farm, Dr . Murphy 
suffered a substantial loss on that sale. When the 
parties married, the total net value of the farm, equip-
ment, buildings, and the 312 acres of the original in-
herited farm in 1964 was $113,600.00. A t the time of 
the sale in 1973. Dr . Murphy received less for the then 
716 acres than the 1964 value of his original farm. The 
total sale price of the farm equipment, buildings, and 
the 716 acres of land was $280,000.00 from which Dr . 
Murphy netted only $77,000.00 (T-171) . Evidence re-
jected by the trial court would have established that the 
Minnesota farm property from which Dr . Murphy 
netted $77,000.00 would have been worth $187,200.00 
for the 312 original acres at the time of the divorce or 
a loss of $110,200.00. 
I n sustaining the objection as to materiality and 
relevancy, the court erred. The proffered evidence 
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would have tended to establish the actual loss. The 
values of the property involved at the time of the di-
vorce were not speculative. Furthermore, it can be said 
with reasonable certainty that he would have had those 
properties had it not been for his marriage to Mrs. 
Cosgriff and what happened during the course of the 
marriage. The weight of the evidence would have been 
a matter for the court to have considered, but certainly 
it should not have been rejected as being speculative. 
The claim for contribution is one of the major 
claims of this action. The facts tending to prove the 
loss suffered and the value of the loss to Dr. Murphy 
are therefore material to this claim. Evidence estab-
lishing a material fact is relevant and should be ad-
mitted, Simpson v. General Motor Corp., 24 Ut. 2d 
301, 470 P. 2d 399 (1970). Furthermore, the valuation 
of property awarded in a divorce case is a material and 
ultimate fact, Wold V. Wold, 7 Wash. App. 872, 50 3 
P. 2d 118 (1972). McCormick states that the most ac-
ceptable test of relevancy is the question "Does the 
evidence offered render the desired inference more prob-
able than it would be without the evidence?", McCor-
mic on Evidence, p. 437. With respect to divorce ac-
tions, even greater liberalities should be extended to 
the admission of testimony than in litigation generally, 
Bursa v. Bursa, 78 Ohio L. Abs. 498, 150 N.E.2d 306 
(1958) Under these tests, it is clear that the offered 
evidence was relevant in that it related to Dr. Murphy's 
true loss. 
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Not only was the offered evidence relevant, but 
Dr. Murphy was a proper witness to be asked these 
questions. The information was solely within his knowl-
edge. The testimony sought would have intended to 
establish the element of a claim for contribution to 
losses sustained during and because of the marriage. 
He was not asked to testify as to the value of the loss 
sustained, but only as to whether, but for his marriage 
to Enid Cosgriff, he would have sold the various prop-
erties. Such testimony is relevant to the issue of his 
loss. 
With respect to the opinion of Dr. Murphy as to 
the value of his land, it is a well-established rule of 
law in Utah that an owner of real property is a proper 
witness to testify as to his opinion of the value of his 
land, Provo Rive?9 Water Users v. Carson, 133 P . 2d 
777; State v. Dillree, 25 Ut. 2d 184, 478 P . 2d 507. 
An owner may also testify as to the value of the im-
provements on land. A general statement of this prop-
osition is found in 32 C.J.S. 546 (120), P . 472; See 
also Mother v. Lack, 41 Cal. App. 23, 181 P . 813. The 
witness was therefore qualified to give his opinion. If 
the Court had received the same, it would have tended 
to establish the true loss sustained to Dr. Murphy. Ac-
cordingly, on this ground, the case should be reversed 
and remanded to the trial court to hear evidence that 
it rejected and in the light thereof evaluate the true 
loss as sustained by Dr. Murphy. 
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P O I N T I I I 
T H E COURT E R R E D IN D E N Y I N G 
M I C H A E L E D W A R D M U R P H Y ' S MOTION 
TO A M E N D T H E P R A Y E R OF H I S COUN-
T E R C L A I M TO S E E K E Q U I T A B L E CON-
T R I B U T I O N TO T H E F I N A N C I A L LOSS 
S U S T A I N E D D U R I N G T H E COURSE OF 
T H E M A R R I A G E . 
During the course of the trial, counsel for the De-
fendant moved the Court to amend the prayer of the 
Counterclaim to request that Enid Cosgriff Murphy 
contribute an amount equal to one-half of the overall 
loss sustained during the course of the marriage (T-
103). The court denied the Motion (T-103). The Mo-
tion was prompted by Plaintiff's objection to testi-
mony the Defendant was seeking to elicit (T-102). The 
Defendant had already introduced evidence of Mrs. 
Cosgriff's involvement in various land purchases and 
developments showing the relationship between her 
actions and losses sustained (T-27, 90-91, 99). Coun-
sel for Mrs. Murphy objected to questions which would 
have elicited further evidence going to those losses (T-
102). The basis for Plaintiff's objection was that the 
evidence being sought was at variance with the prayer 
of the Counterclaim and not justified under the rules 
(T-102). 
This Court will note that the Counterclaim (R-4) 
requested that because of Mrs. Cosgriff's action she 
be required to make certain payments and also sought 
25 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"such other and further relief as the Court may deem 
proper" (R-6). 
Inasmuch as the status of the property had changed 
following the date of the filing of the Counterclaim 
(R-59) and to remove any question as to the scope of 
the prayer of the Counterclaim, counsel for the De-
fendant moved the Court to amend to specifically de-
mand that Mrs. Murphy contribute an amount equal 
to one-half of the overall loss sustained during the 
course of the marriage (T-103). 
The Defendant contends that the prayer of his 
Counterclaim was already sufficiently broad to allow 
the trial court to require Mrs. Murphy to contribute to 
one-half of the loss sustained. However, in view of the 
trial court's denial of the Motion to Amend and in view 
of the court's failure to require Mrs. Murphy to con-
tribute to the loss sustained, the trial court's ruling on 
the Motion to Amend the Prayer of the Complaint be-
comes most significant. 
I t is now unclear whether or not the trial court's 
refusal to require any financial contribution on the part 
of Mrs. Cosgriff was prompted by the equities of the 
case or what the court considered a too restrictive 
Counterclaim demand which the court was unwilling to 
amend. 
If the prayer of the Complaint was already suf-
ficiently broad, then the amendment, though technically 
unnecessary, would have removed any question and 
would have been harmless. On the other hand, if the 
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prayer of the Counterclaim needed to be more specific, 
then it was a flagrant abuse of discretion to deny the 
amendment and create a technical basis for doing less 
than equity requires in the case. 
I t is the Defendant's position that the prayer of 
the Counterclaim was sufficient and that the Court 
could well have required contribution. However, as 
indicated, having made the Motion to Amend which 
was denied there arises an uncertainty as to the rela-
tionship of that denial and the unwillingness of the 
Court to require a contribution by Mrs. Murphy to 
the financial losses sustained. 
Certainly the question of whether or not Enid Cos-
griff Murphy should contribute to the losses sustained 
ought not to turn on any technical question of whether 
or not the prayer of the Counterclaim was sufficiently 
broad. In view of our rules of civil procedure allow-
ing amendment, no trial court ought to deny a Motion 
to Amend a Counterclaim in circumstances such as 
those in the instant case—and certainly not as a tech-
nical basis for precluding a contribution. The question 
of whether or not Mrs. Murphy ought to contribute to 
the losses sustained ought to turn on the existing 
equities which demand that she should. 
I t is a well-established rule of law that when evid-
ence has been introduced with respect to a material 
fact in question, an amendment to conform to such proof 
is appropriate, 71 C.J.S. 285, P . 612; recognized in 
Utah, Newton v. Tracy Loan § Trust Co., 88 Utah 547, 
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40 P . 2d 204; In Re: Bundy's Estate, 21 Utah 299, 241 
P . 2d 462. Furthermore, Rule 15 (b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure was an ample basis for allow-
ing the amendment. 
In addition, the Motion to Amend neither consti-
tuted a variance with the original Counterclaim nor 
was it a wholly different cause of action. I t was only 
made as a means of amplification and elaboration of 
matters stated in the original Counterclaim. Amend-
ments sought to clarify a cause of action of an original 
pleading and which are germane thereto, have been 
held by this court to not constitute new matters and 
not at variance with the original pleadings, Crane v. 
Crane, 102 Utah 411, 131 P.2d 1022; Hartford Acci-
dent and Indemnity Co. v. Clegg, 103 Utah 414, 135 
P.2d 919; Graham v. Street, 109 Utah 460, 166 P.2d 
524. The rule established in Wells v. Wells, 2 U. 2d 
241, 272 P.2d 167 is particularly in point. 
". . . the test is not whether under technical rules 
of pleading a new cause of action is introduced, 
but rather the test is whether a wholly different 
cause of action or legal obligation is introduced; 
that is, an amendment will be allowed if a change 
is not made in the liability sought to be enforced 
against the defendant." Id. at 170. 
In this case, no "wholly different cause of action" 
or "legal obligation" was introduced, nor was a change 
made in the liability sought to be enforced against Mrs. 
Murphy in the amended Counterclaim. The original 
pleadings contemplated contribution and the amend-
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ment merely amplified and more clearly defined what 
the original counterclaim intended. 
This Court should hold that the prayer of the Com-
plaint seeking "such other and further relief as the 
Court may deem proper," is sufficient to require Enid 
Cosgriff Murphy to contribute to one-half of the losses 
sustained during the marriage. If this Court should 
hold that such a prayer for relief is not sufficient to 
require Enid Cosgriff Murphy to contribute to one-
half of the losses sustained, then the trial court should 
be reversed and the defendant's Motion to Amend al-
lowed to the end that the matter of contribution to the 
losses sustained will turn on the equities involved and 
not on the technical form of a prayer for relief. 
P O I N T IV 
T H E COURT C O M M I T T E D E R R O R I N 
NOT A W A R D I N G T H E D E C R E E OF D I -
VORCE TO DR. M I C H A E L M U R P H Y OR A T 
L E A S T G R A N T I N G H I M A DIVORCE AS 
W E L L AS TO E N I D C O S G R I F F . 
The Court's attention is invited to the testimony 
of Enid Cosgriff Murphy with respect to her alleged 
grounds for divorce found on pages 3 through 15 of 
the record. In vague, general terms, lacking in specif-
icity, gravity and recency, she referred to Dr. Murphy's 
"criticisms" (T-7). Indeed her testimony, for the more 
part, amounts to nothing more than her own conclu-
sions. 
29 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I t should be pointed out that the parties separ-
ated from September to December in 1968 (T-9). 
With much of her testimony with respect to grounds, 
there is no indication whether what Enid Cosgriff 
Murphy was complaining about was before or after 
they separated. 
She complained that following the reconciliation 
some portion of his prior conduct began again (T-10). 
but there is nothing to indicate exactly what it was or 
when it took place (T-10). She testified that, "those 
actions and statements and attitudes" continued in late 
March, April or May of 1972, but this vague conclu-
sion is totally lacking in specificity as to what "actions," 
what "statements," and what "attitudes" were involved 
( T - l l ) . 
Mrs. Murphy complained of Dr. Murphy's being 
critical of certain "fiction" which Dr. Murphy allegedly 
referred to as "Enid's trash" (T-12), but there is noth-
ing to indicate specifically what happened, what was 
involved, or whether it occurred before or after the 
parties reconciled. As far as this record is concerned, 
there is nothing to show that any criticism of Mrs. 
Murphy's reading occurred following the reconciliation. 
There is also some general complaint that Dr. 
Murphy "criticized" her "loyalty to the business ad-
visors who might have inherited along with the property 
from Walter Cosgriff with a blind loyalty and that I 
didn't analyze them. . . ." (T-13). This all appears 
to have taken place prior to the reconciliation. 
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Then counsel for Enid Cosgriff Murphy finally 
asked, "Now tell us, if you will, what effect this con-
duct that you have mentioned by the Defendant, what 
effect did that have on you?" There is no indication 
in the record of what conduct was being referred to 
(T-13). 
Apparently the event that caused Mrs. Murphy 
to leave Dr. Murphy was an episode involving a water 
heater (T-11, 12, 14). There is no indication of what 
Dr. Murphy did. All Mrs. Murphy states is the he 
created a "very bad scene over the malfunction of the 
water heater" (T-12) or "created a scene" (T-14). I t 
is the court's function and not Mrs. Murphy's to draw 
conclusions. 
General assertions of misconduct in the absence of 
direct proof are of insufficient probitive value to war-
rent a divorce for mental cruelty. A general statement 
of this proposition of law is found in 27A C.J.S. 143 
(3)e, P . 527. This court adhered to this general prin-
ciple in Hyrup v. Hyrup, 66 Utah 580, 245 P. 335 
where it told that: 
"Courts are not authorized to grant divorces ex-
cept for the particular causes prescribed by law, 
and then only when the grounds or cause for di-
vorce is proved by substantial and satisfactory 
evidence." 
Mrs. Murphy's testimony is simply insufficient to sus-
tain a Decree of Divorce in her favor. 
The real problem in this marriage was that of 
which Dr. Murphy complained (R-5). From the out-
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set Mrs. Murphy was neither committed to the mar-
riage nor to Dr. Murphy (T-72). Mrs. Murphy was 
wrapped up in the preservation and perpetuation of 
the Cosgriff name, fame and fortune. The background 
of what happened following Mr. Cosgriff's death and 
continuing after Enid Cosgriff's marriage to Dr. 
Murphy is reflected in her own testimony (T-15, 20) 
and Dr. Murphy's testimony (T-68). 
Enid Cosgriff Murphy admitted on cross-examin-
ation that she may have told Dr. Murphy, prior to 
the marriage, that she was fatigued and intended to 
completely retire from public service and public life 
after ". . . completion of the baseball venture" (T-22), 
but this she did not do. What Enid Cosgriff did after 
the marriage constituted ample grounds for divorce in 
favor of Dr. Murphy. Mrs. Cosgriff was never really 
Dr. Murphy's wife. As a matter of fact, she constantly 
preferred being referred to as Mrs. Enid Cosgriff 
rather than Mrs. Murphy. She admitted that she con-
tinued using the name Cosgriff well after her marriage 
to Dr. Murphy (T-16). The reason that she gave was 
that the name "Cosgriff" had become well known 
throughout Utah. She implied that it was necessary to 
keep the name in order to keep the sports contacts 
necessary for the operation of the Salt Lake Bees Base-
ball team with which she had become affiliated (T-16). 
But her involvement terminated shortly after she mar-
ried Dr. Murphy (T-16). However, rather than give 
up the name Cosgriff and assume the name Murphy 
for all purposes, she persisted in the continued use of 
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the Cosgriff name (T-18). This had an obvious de-
moralizing effect on Dr. Murphy (T-79). He felt that 
he was losing his own personality (T-79). Dr. Murphy 
assumed at the outset of the marriage that Enid Cos-
griff would assume the Murphy name and be his wife 
(T-70). 
Even after they moved to Minnesota where the 
Cosgriff name had no significance whatsoever, Mrs. 
Murphy persisted in using the Cosgriff name (T-71, 
72). There is nothing to refute Dr. Murphy's testi-
mony that throughout his marriage, he felt he was never 
married to Mrs. Cosgriff. She remained Mrs. Walter 
Cosgriff from the day he married her until the day she 
left(T-96). 
Typical of Mrs. Murphy's obsession with the Cos-
griff name, fame and fortune was the "golf shrine" 
[ocated at a residence of Mrs. Murphy kept at 401 11th 
Avenue (T-29) (Exhibits 6-P, 7-P, 8-D). On their 
seventh anniversary in 1971, a party was given by Mrs. 
Cosgriff at the 11th Avenue home (T-91). Some 150 
people were present (T-91). Located in a conspicuous 
iisplay was a golf shrine exhibiting the golf trophies 
3f her former husband, Walter Cosgriff (Exhibits 7-P 
and 8-D). During the course of the party, many of the 
quests passed by the schrine with statements being made 
to Dr. Murphy such as: "Michael, rather than mar-
riage, this is an imitation. Why aren't some of your 
ski trophies in this display?" (T-92). I t is obvious that 
the golf shrine had a demoralizing effect on Dr. 
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Murphy and tended to relegate him to something less 
than a husband of Mrs. Cosgriff. 
Mrs. Cosgriff was often critical of Dr. Murphy's 
family. On one particular occasion, Mrs. Cosgriff told 
Dr. Murphy's sister-in-law who was staying with the 
Murphy's in Minnesota that the sister-in-law was de-
stroying the evening and that it was impossible to carry 
on a conversation with her (T-76). Dr. Murphy's 
family refused to come again after this incident. On 
another occasion in front of Dr. Murphy's two neices, 
Mrs. Cosgriff stormed out of the house while they were 
having a discussion with Dr. Murphy and Mrs. Cos-
griff (T-77). On another occasion in Minnesota, in 
approximately January of 1972, Dr. Murphy and Mrs. 
Cosgriff had given several parties and after one par-
ticular party, Mrs. Cosgriff carried on by screaming, 
shouting, slamming doors and stamping her feet, all of 
which Dr. Murphy was not prepared for and caused 
him great anxiety (T-79). 
Mrs. Cosgriff never consulted Dr. Murphy about 
financial matters. She would always discuss these mat-
ters with her attorneys and would never involve Dr. 
Murphy. As a result, Dr. Murphy felt more of an ad-
versary to her and her lawyers than he did a husband 
(T-96, 97). This process of consulting attorneys with-
out Dr. Murphy's knowledge continued even after the 
parties moved to Minnesota (T-97). 
Mrs. Cosgriff also took extended trips abroad 
without Dr. Murphy. After persuading Dr. Murphy 
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to move to Minnesota, Mrs. Murphy told Dr. Murphy 
that she did not intend to stay there (T-74). She de-
scribed Minnesota as a dreadful place and promptly 
left for Europe with her sister and brother-in-law (T-
74). Dr. Murphy was then alone to run the farm Mrs. 
Murphy had moved him on to without any assistance 
from her. 
The right of a husband to have a Decree of Di-
vorce is well established, Section 30-3-2, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953). Older case law has held that in 
order for the husband to secure a divorce on the grounds 
o{ mental cruelty, aggravated grounds must be shown, 
Doe v. Doe, 48 Utah 200, 158 Pac. 781; Schuster v. 
Schuster, 88 Utah 257, 53 P. 2d 428. The reason given 
for this in Alldredge v. Alldredge, 119 Ut. 2d 504, 229 
P. 2d 681, was that: 
"The woman is more sensitive than the man and 
that she is not so much inured to life's buffet-
ings; hence, that acts and conduct on the part of 
a husband may well constitute cruelty to the 
wife, causing her great mental distress when 
similar acts and conduct on her part may not 
constitute cruelty to him or cause him great men-
tal distress." Id.'at 663 
However, the court implied that this rule may not 
be applicable, "in this non-chivalrous age of economic 
equality of the sexes and the wife's emergence from the 
home into the business and professional realms." Id. 
at 663. In that case, the court upheld the Decree of 
Divorce in the husband's favor in view of the wife's 
conduct in allowing numerous parties in the home. It 
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should be noted that the standard of allowing the wife 
a divorce for mental cruelty on less provocation than 
the husband has been modified elsewhere where facts 
present a stronger case for the husband, Woolley v. 
Woolley, 113 Utah 391,195 P.2d 743. 
The present case involves facts that fall within the 
language of Alldredge, supra. Mrs. Cosgriff is a fin-
ancially independent person. Her wealth had made her 
very independent of Dr. Murphy. The rule of requir-
ing the husband to adduce evidence showing aggravated 
mental cruelty as Doe and Schuster, supra, is plainly 
not applicable here. She was used to the buffetings of 
life and was emotionally equipped to meet them. Under 
this theory, the evidence she produced of mental cruelty 
by Dr. Murphy is insufficient. 
Under the established law of this State, Dr. 
Murphy's assertions of mental cruelty have been sub-
stantiated. The evidence was ample to allow the court 
to grant the divorce to Dr. Murphy. This Court has 
held that where the husband has established facts in-
dicating mental cruelty by the wife, the husband should 
be awarded the divorce, Griffiths v. Griffiths, 3 Ut. 
2d 82 278 P.2d 983 (1955). In that case, evidence in-
dicated that the wife constantly nagged the husband 
causing frequent separations between them, not unlike 
the present case. 
If the Court believes Mrs. Cosgriff has established 
sufficient evidence establishing mental cruelty, then 
this court should award the divorce to both parties. 
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This rule of granting each the divorce is well estab-
ished in the Utah law. In Sartain v. Sartain, 15 Ut. 2d 
98, 389 P. 2d 1023 (1964), Justice Henriod in a con-
curring opinion stated: 
"From the record, I cannot see where the de-
fendant was pearly white and plaintiff only 
pearly gray-white or where plaintiff shouted too 
loudly but defendant less audibly. I believe this 
is a case where each and both parties should have 
been granted a divorce, in that the Hendricks case 
should be tempered where the acts of cruelty ap-
proach a clash in the middle of the domestic 
spectroscope. I think the case well might have 
been resolved by granting to each of the litigants 
a divorce, which might be helpful, but hardly 
harmful to anyone that this issue was not urged 
on appeal." Id. at 1023. 
This Court has also reiterated this rule in Mullins v. 
lullins, 26 Ut. 2d 82, 485 P . 2d 663 (1971) where 
Jection 30-3-2, Utah Code Annotated (1953) was in-
erpreted. This Court held that the trial court was in 
rror in not awarding both sides a Decree of Divorce 
fhere both were equally at fault. 
Accordingly, on the record of this case, it was Dr. 
lurphy who had grounds for divorce and not Enid 
"osgriff Murphy. It was an abuse of discretion for 
tie trial court to award the Decree of Divorce to Mrs. 
lurphy and ignore Dr. Murphy's grounds. And even 
?
 this court holds that Mrs. Murphy's "grounds" were 
dequate, then it should award a Decree of Divorce to 
)r. Murphy also under the established law of this State 
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as noted above or remanded the case to the trial court 
with directions to also grant Dr. Murphy a Decree of 
Divorce. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the trial court should be reversed 
and Enid Cosgriff Murphy should be required to con-
tribute an amount equal to one-half of the losses sus-
tained (based on evidence received by the Court) by 
paying to Dr. Murphy the sum of $44,495.00, the same 
being one-half of the total loss sustained. This is in 
accordance with the argument under Point I hereof 
and gives credit for the cancelled Promissory Note. 
In addition, the true loss sustained by Dr. Murphy 
should be determined and accordingly, the case should 
be remanded to the trial court to receive additional 
evidence on the present value of assets initially brought 
into the marriage by Dr. Murphy as a base for deter-
mining his real loss as urged in Point I I hereof. That 
is, on remand to the trial court, current values must be 
determined of assets initially owned by Dr. Murphy, 
which assets he would reasonably been expected to own 
at the time of the divorce except for his marriage to 
Enid Cosgriff. The difference between his initial net 
worth and ending net worth (taking into account the 
appreciated value of assets initially owned) represents 
his true loss and the Court should have received evid-
ence of the same. 
38 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Consistent with the argument under Point I I I , this 
ourt should rule that the prayer for relief in the Coun-
erclaim seeking "such other and further relief as the 
ourt may deem proper," is sufficiently broad to re-
uire a contribution to losses on the part of Enid Cos-
;riff Murphy. If this Court rules otherwise, then this 
"ourt should reverse the trial court and its denial of 
he amendment moved for and allow the amendment to 
he prayer of the Counterclaim to specifically require 
contribution to losses. 
In addition, as argued under Point IV hereof, this 
"ourt should reverse the trial court and hold that Enid 
"osgrif f Murphy has not sustained her burden of prov-
ig grounds for divorce and accordingly, this Court 
hould award the divorce to Dr. Murphy. In the event 
his Court holds that the evidence is sufficient to sus-
ain the trial court's award of a Decree of Divorce to 
Cnid Cosgriff Murphy, then this Court should also 
ward a Decree of Divorce to Dr. Murphy or in the 
lternative, remand the case to the trial court with 
irections to the trial court to enter a Decree of Di-
orce in his favor as well as to Mrs. Murphy. 
As this Court eloquently stated in the divorce ac-
ion of Anderson v. Anderson, 18 Ut. 2d 286, 422 P . 
d192, 194: 
"Any business venture is accompanied by some 
risk of failure and to say that because a husband 
managed these investments, it is his loss but that 
she will nevertheless share in the profitable por-
tion of his financial endeavors, is an untenable 
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suggestion. She married him for 'better or worse' 
This does not mean the 'better' for her and the 
c
 worse' for him J" (emphasis added) 
The instant case is even stronger than the Ander-
son case, where in the instant case the record shows 
that Enid Cosgriff Murphy was the real driving force 
and "manager" that led to the disastrous losses incurred. 
Respectfully submitted. 
McKAY, BURTON, McMURRAY & T H U R M A N 
By 
Macoy A. McMurray 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
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A P P E N D I X 
The interrogation of Dr. Murphy at the trial of 
le case, objections made, the action of the Court with 
jspect to the evidence bearing on the present value of 
le assets brought into the marriage by Dr. Murphy 
ad offers of proof are as follows: 
(T-132) MR. McMURRAY: . . . What value do 
you place on that, or did you place on that in-
itial farm at the time of your separation when 
you owned the property? 
MR. SNOW: Object this as completely im-
material and irrelevant. 
(T-139) T H E COURT: Wel l I think the way 
the question was phrased, that it is objectionable. 
MR. McMURRAY: I have in mind, Dr. 
Murphy, the 312 acres which you inherited. I 
have in mind the improvements which were on 
the property when you entered into this mar-
riage.. I have in mind any maintenance that 
might have been done. Obviously, you kept it 
up. I understand that. Now, if there were addi-
tional items purchased additional improvements 
made, and I thing you have testified there may 
have been some; I'm not asking that. You can 
exclude those. That would reduce any figure 
that you can exclude those. That would reduce 
any figure that you would have in mind. I have 
in mind simply what you started out with as to 
that initial acreage with the improvements that 
were then on it as they had been maintained up 
to the time you sold it, and I want you to tell 
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the Court what you valued it at, or would value 
it at as an owner. 
(T-140) MR. SNOW: Objection. There's still 
no foundation for that. 
T H E COURT: The objection will be sus-
tained. 
* * * 
(T-140) MR. McMURRAY: Comes now the 
defendant in this case by and through his at-
torney and makes this offer of proof with re-
spect to the matter which there has just been 
some discussion about. May the record show that 
if Dr. Murphy were permitted to testify on this 
matter, he would do so as an owner of the prop-
erty that he is being interrogated about, that is, 
he owned it at the time that I am asking him to 
give a value, and that his testimony would be 
that a fair value for the property would be 
$600.00 per acre; that the $600.00 per acre would 
be a figure which would cover the home that was 
initially there and the improvements that were 
initially there as they have been maintained over 
the period of time up until the time that Mrs. 
Cosgriff left, and that that $600.00 per acre 
would exclude additional improvements that 
might have been made and were made, or any 
other buildings or expansion projects which were 
not a part of the acreage when he entered into 
the marriage, and that accordingly, the value of 
the farm acreage at that time that I am inquir-
ing about would be according to my calculations 
$600.00 per acre for 312 acres, for a total of 
$187,200.00 as representing Dr. Murphy's opin-
ion as to the value of the property at the time 
indicated. 
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(T-145) MR .McMURRAY: Now, Dr. Murphy, 
if you had not married Enid Cosgriff, can you 
state with reasonable certainty whether or not 
you would have continued your medical practice 
here in Salt Lake City? 
MR. SNOW: Objection. Objected to as im-
material and irrelevant. They did get married, 
and he was a grown man at the time. 
T H E COURT: Sustained. 
* * # 
(T-145) MR. McMURRAY: The defendant act-
ing by and through his counsel now makes this 
offer of proof, that had it not been for the mar-
riage to Enid Cosgriff, that he would state with 
reasonable probability that there was nothing 
that would indicate that he should leave this area, 
that he would still be practicing medicine in his 
field of specialty here in Salt Lake City. 
(T-145) MR. McMURRAY: Dr. Murphy, can 
you state with reasonable certainty if it hadn't 
have been for your marriage to Enid Cosgriff 
whether or not you would still be owing the basic 
acreage which you inherited in Minnesota, the 
312 acres, the Brighton property that you had 
described, the cottage, the canyon property, and 
the house on Fortuna Way ? 
MR. SNOW: Objection. Objected to, Your 
Honor, for the reasons previously stated, and 
also because it's pure speculation. It's totally 
irrelevant and immaterial to the issues in this 
case. 
T H E COURT: Sustained. 
(T-146) MR. McMURRAY: The defendant by 
and through his counsel makes this offer of 
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proof, and if permitted to testify, the defendant 
would testify in substance that were it not for 
the marriage to Enid Cosgriff that he believes 
with reasonable probability that he would still 
own the basic acreage that he had inherited in 
Minnesota, the 312 acres, that it is doubtful that 
he would have acquired any other additional 
acreage surrounding it, that he would still have 
the canyon property in Brighton, and that he 
would still have the home and residence on For-
tuna Way. 
* * * 
(T-148) MR. McMURRAY: May the record 
show that we have had a discussion in chambers, 
and that I have considered with the Court and 
with counsel the calling of Mr. Sterling Webber, 
who I will represent to the Court is a qualified 
real estate appraiser, and have indicated to the 
Court my desire to call him to testify as to the 
present values of the home on Fortuna Way and 
the present value of the Brighton cabin property, 
which would include the acreage and the cabin, 
and that I understand that there would be an 
objection made to my calling — an objection 
made on the part of Mr. Snow to his so testify-
ing, and I understand that the Court would sus-
tain that objection, and I would, therefore, pro-
ceed with an offer of proof, if that correctly 
represents our understanding. 
* * * 
(T-148) MR. McMURRAY: The defendant. Dr. 
Michael E . Murphy, acting by and through his 
counsel, makes this offer of proof, that if Mr. 
Sterling Webber were called and permitted to 
testify, that he would testify first as to his qual-
ifications as a real estate appraiser in our area, 
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that he would testify extensively as to those qual-
ifications, and that he had gone to the home on 
Fortuna Way which has been identified in this 
proceeding which was the home that was occu-
pied by Dr. Murphy at the time that he married 
Enid Cosgriff; that he would testify as to his 
appraisal of the property, his evaluation, his go-
ing upon it, and that he has made a thorough 
appraisal report, and that the value of the prop-
erty today would be $64,800.00, provided, how-
ever, that there is a kitchen improvement in the 
property of $4,000.00, which was made by the 
subsequent owner and/or occupant of the prop-
erty, which was not made, of course, by Dr. 
Murphy; and therefore, the value of the lot and 
the home as Dr. Murphy occupied it on today's 
market would be $60,800.00. Is that correct? 
$60,800.00. With respect to the Brighton cabin 
property, if Mr. Webber were permitted to test-
ify, he would testify that he did go, that he has 
gone to the cabin property, appraised it, and 
that in his opinion the fair market value of the 
Brighton cabin property as identified in this pro-
ceeding, and which Dr. Murphy owned at the 
time he entered into this marriage with Enid 
Cosgriff, that was subsequently sold, that its' 
value today would be $28,000.00; that the prop-
erty would actually have a value of $31,000.00, 
except for the impact of an existing zoning ord-
inance which he feels has diminished that value 
by $4,000.00 leaving a value of that property on 
today's market at $28,000.00. That would be 
sufficient on that offer of proof, Your Honor. 
(T-149) T H E COURT: I suppose you have an 
objection to that testimony being offered? 
MR. SNOW: I would object to it, that the 
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present value of that property would be totally 
irrelevant, immaterial, and outside the issues of 
this ease. 
T H E COURT: Your objection will be sus-
tained. Do you have other questions of the doc-
tor? 
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